MissionPay
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AVALANCHE FUJI • LIVE ARENA

Twin Treasury: Allowlist Still Drains, Mission Reverts

Same poisoned invoice prompt injection specifying a recognized company vendor. Real architectural comparison on Avalanche Fuji GuardedTreasury.

NOT RUN ON-CHAIN

No evidence file (twin.live.json or twin.dryrun.json) found. Run scripts/twin-treasury.ts to execute fork simulation or broadcast.

Vendor (0xE90c...1aEA) is globally allowlisted, legitimate payee is Owner (0x4BC9...8F7c).View Contract on Snowtrace ↗
MISSION A • twin.allowlist.v1FUNDS DRAINED

Treasury A: Global Allowlist Mode

This contract in global-allowlist mode (payee root = 0x0)

payeeRoot: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
recipientAllowlist(vendor): pending
call: propose(opA, vendor, 10000, twin.allowlist.v1, reason)
Result: NOT RUN

The attacker tricks the agent with a poisoned invoice naming a recognized vendor. Because the contract only checks a global allowlist and the amount <= perTxCap, funds are immediately drained via safeTransfer in propose().

Status: NOT RUN
MISSION B • twin.mission.v1BLOCKS DIVERTED & PAYS LEGIT PAYEE

Treasury B: Mission-Scoped Guard (MissionPay)

Owner-signed Merkle payee root per mission

1. Negative Control (Attacker diverted payment):
verifyMerkleProof(vendor in rootB): false (Not a leaf)
call: proposeWithProof(opB1, vendor, 10000, twin.mission.v1, ..., [])
Result: NOT RUN
2. Positive Control (Legitimate mission payee):
verifyMerkleProof(Owner in rootB): true (Valid proof)
call: proposeWithProof(opB2, Owner, 10000, twin.mission.v1, ..., proof)
Result: NOT RUN

When the attacker attempts to divert payment to a non-mission vendor, the contract validates the Merkle root on-chain and rejects the transaction with PayeeNotInMissionSet. Simultaneously, the authorized mission payee with valid proof is successfully paid.

Status: NOT RUN

Core Takeaway from Twin Treasury

Global allowlists fail against indirect prompt injection when an attacker instructs the agent to pay another recognized vendor. Only mission-scoped payee roots bound on-chain block diverted payments while safely executing payouts to legitimate vendors.